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ELECTION night 2008 marked a historic moment in US history. Not only didthe US elect its first African-American president, but it did so at a time when
Jim Crow was still within living memory. At the time of President Obama’s birth
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was still three years away and his parents, a white
woman and black man, were forbidden from marrying in much of the country. So
juxtaposed, the election of Obama seems all the more remarkable as it was made
possible by extraordinary moral and political change in a relatively short time.
Many Americans, no doubt, spent election night reflecting on the ways that our
society is clearly better today in comparison to fifty years ago.
I take the public understanding of Obama’s election to be a story about ethical
progress. But in bringing a philosophical outlook to this sort of story we must ask
whether it is really compelling—is genuine ethical progress actually possible?
What makes us think that the changes to our beliefs, values, and practices
regarding race which have occurred since the time of Jim Crow are actually
improvements and not mere changes of mind or taste?1 In what follows I want to
vindicate our sense that events like the election of the first black President of the
United States can indeed be ethically progressive by positing and defending a
particular way of conceiving of progress in the domain of values.
Before laying out my argumentative strategy, I want to discuss the motivation of
such a project. Why should we focus on a notion of evaluative progress? Answers
having to do with confidence in our own values and our ability to understand
ourselves as having made and rectified ethical mistakes come quickly to mind. For
instance, if we cannot vindicate the idea that some ethical values are better than
others, then we seem to lose all ground for thinking that our current racially (more)
egalitarian beliefs and practices are preferable to Jim Crow beliefs and practices.
*A number of people have contributed to this article. I thank Elizabeth Anderson, Peter Railton,
and Laura Ruetsche in particular for extensive comments and discussion. Thanks also Marie
Jayasekera, reviewer Lea Ypi, an anonymous referee, and Bob Goodin for helpful comments and
editorial suggestions. Material from this article was previously presented at the University of
Michigan’s Graduate Student Working Group and the 2009 Central States Philosophical Conference;
I thank Will Thomas and Hallie Liberto as well as the audiences at those presentations for their
comments.
1Throughout the article I refer to ethical “beliefs” simply to invoke the ordinary language sense of
the term, not to take up a cognitivist metaethical view.
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Of course, not just any notion of progress will provide us with the same sort
of confidence in our beliefs or with justification for avowing some values and not
others. Consider two different approaches to the question of progress—on the
one hand what I call utopian views and on the other what I refer to as the
evolutionary view. The first kind of utopian conception of ethical progress posits
an ideal ethical end-state, claims that this end-state is the one and only one best
way for the world to be, and understands progress in terms of coming closer to
that end-state.2 So, for example, Obama’s presidency might be thought to
represent an improvement in race relations in the sense that the willingness of
millions of Americans to be governed by a black president is one step closer to the
ideal state of the world in which race is no longer a socially salient category.
Closely related to this “progress as getting closer to the ideal end-state” view
is a second utopian view, whose conception of progress posits not one ideal state
of the world toward which we aim, but merely a fixed standard of evaluation by
which we can distinguish improvement from mere change or deterioration. So
one might alternatively understand Obama’s election on this view not as getting
us closer to the one best way for the world to be, but perhaps as representing
Americans overcoming traditional racial prejudices (where less prejudice is
understood to be a fixed criterion of ethical improvement).
These utopian views do seem prima facie plausible. It often seems to be the
case that we can compare two or more performances or outcomes only if we hold
an unchanging standard of evaluation—whether an ideal end goal or a fixed
criterion of improvement—at the time of both of the performances/outcomes.
The attractiveness of utopian views notwithstanding, there is still room to worry
about this way of conceiving of progress. After all, couldn’t our standards of
evaluation themselves improve and, if so, by what constant (likely higher order)
standard could we determine that these changes are improvements? Is it not
possible that as we look to higher order standards to understand improvement in
lower order standards we will at some point find that there is no constant
standard at work? This kind of case—translated into the domain of ethics—will
be the focus of much of this article.
An alternative picture of progress which does not assume the existence of such
a higher order standard is the evolutionary view, which we are familiar with in
philosophy of science in Kuhn’s work.3 Applying Kuhn’s view to the ethical
domain, we can imagine a conception of progress which involves radical moral
transformations occurring in times of crisis. If such a view were to stay true to
Kuhn’s conception of the history of science, this view would hold that no matter
how unworkable a traditional ethical view might be, most individuals will not
2Cf. Stan Godlovitch, “Morally we roll along: (optimistic reflections) on moral progress,” Journal
of Applied Philosophy, 15 (2001), 271–86.
3Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1962).
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abandon that view until a rival framework is provided by a small number of
particularly bold individuals who respond to the ethical crisis at hand.4 But
Kuhn’s picture is often accused of failing to sufficiently explain the objectivity
and rationality of science; specifically, critics object that he cannot account for the
progressiveness of science across paradigm shifts. Thus progress on Kuhn’s view
is often thought to be secured only in local form—relative to a particular
paradigm. Indeed, I will shortly suggest that a similar objection applies to
evolutionary approaches to ethical progress as well.
The sort of view I will argue for leans in the direction of the evolutionary
model. Like Kuhn’s view of scientific progress (and unlike utopian accounts of
ethical progress), my account of ethical progress does not posit an ideal ethical
end state or a fixed ethical criterion. However, I also take quite seriously the
worry that Kuhn fails to sufficiently account for progress through paradigm
changes. A major point of this article will be to show that my view can account
for progress even through radical ethical changes.5
The view I will be offering takes inspiration from the ethical work of John
Dewey; like Dewey, I will conceive of progress in terms of resolving problems.
This conception allows for the rational revision of ends as well as means, while
still providing for the possibility of progress even as our standards of evaluation
or the ethical ends toward which we aim change. Such an account of progress
offers a response to the sorts of concerns raised above about justification,
confidence, and rectifying mistakes.
My overall aim in this article is to elaborate on such an account and, in so
doing, to offer a compelling way of understanding events such as the election of
the first black President of the US as an instance of genuine progress. In Section
I, I clarify the particular goals I aim to accomplish in this article. In Section II, I
motivate my interest in a non-utopian account of progress and describe a
challenge which all non-utopian accounts face—a tension between maintaining a
sense of objectivity and rationality and allowing for radical revisions of value to
count as progress. In Sections III and IV, I spell out my own non-utopian account
of progress in terms of problem-resolution and respond to two first pass
objections to it. I then go on, in Section V, to show how the problem-based view
satisfactorily deals with the tension discussed in Section II. Finally, I conclude in
Section VI by considering an important lingering worry about the
problem-resolving view and gesturing toward a response.
4This Kuhnian approach to ethical progress is strikingly similar to the account of progress that
Richard Rorty offers by invoking the evolutionary metaphor. See Section II.B.
5My view might be seen as a taking up a similar position in ethics as Lakatos’ response to Kuhn
takes up in philosophy of science. See Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the methodology of scientific
research programmes,” Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 91–196. Thanks to reviewer Lea Ypi and Dan
Peterson for calling my attention to this similarity.
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I. CLARIFYING THE PROJECT
I want to begin by clearing away some misconceptions about what I might
be up to in this article. I set myself the modest goal of explicating and
defending as plausible a particular model of progress in the domain of the
good—that is, with regard to questions of how to live and to which ideals to
commit.6
Additionally, I want to make clear that I am not primarily invested in
vindicating the view that particular cases of change are progressive. I refer
extensively in this article to the examples of the election of Obama, second-wave
feminism’s transformation of women’s relation to work, and a neo-Nazi’s turn to
tolerance; but this is not an article about these recent historical or current events.
Rather these cases are of a kind—they are instances of what we take,
common-sensibly and with little doubt, to be progressive. It is in this spirit that
I refer to them.
Nor am I interested in defending a global historical claim about the tendency
of humans or of individual societies to progress ethically or otherwise throughout
history. My concern instead is the very idea of ethical progress. I aim to show
how it is possible (and plausible) that some ethical practices and values are better
than others and how we can learn which are which. I attempt to show this by
developing a model of what ethical progress might be like. In an important sense,
I base this model of ethical progress on a more general model of epistemic
improvement. Particularly relevant to my account, then, are questions of when
we are warranted in our (ethical) beliefs and how we can justify claims about
improvement in those beliefs. The role played by epistemic reasoning and norms
in my account will become particularly apparent in Section V as I appeal to a
notion of practical or emotional coherence.
With the general aim of this article and the background assumptions a bit
clearer, I will now move on to say more about the main challenge for non-utopian
accounts of progress which I hope to overcome.
II. NON-UTOPIAN PROGRESS
I have suggested thus far that I will be putting forth a non-utopian model of
progress. Let me say a bit more now about what is problematic about a utopian
(or quasi-utopian) view.
6In narrowing my aim in this way I intend to leave room for a variety of views about how to
conceive of the relation between the evaluative and deontic domains. I tend to think that there are
important contrasts between the right and the good along the lines T.M. Scanlon outlines; given these
differences, I suspect a unified problem-resolving model which applies to each of these three domains
can be offered only by importing some modifications of a contractualist sort. Unfortunately I cannot
pursue this issue here. See T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1998), pp. 171–6.
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A. AGAINST THE UTOPIAN PICTURE
On the utopian view, progress is a matter of getting closer to our ultimate moral
destination, whether understood as an end-state of the world or as a fixed moral
criterion which we could eventually fully meet. Michele Moody-Adams voices
two concerns about this view. The first is that conceiving of progress in this way
might easily lead to skepticism about progress, as a result of skepticism about
“proof of access to an objective standard of moral rightness.”7 In other words,
how can we conclude that some changes are improvements unless we already
know what the ideal end-state or the fixed moral criterion is?
I share something like Moody-Adams’ worry, though my concerns are best
understood through a pragmatist lens. Like Dewey, I do not find the notion of an
independent moral order in the form of an ideal end-state or an ultimate standard
of morality plausible. It should be clear why the question of how moral progress
is possible becomes pressing for philosophers (like myself) who doubt the
existence of an objective moral order of either of these sorts. It seems straight
away inconsistent to accept the utopian account of progress, the non-existence of
an independent moral order (in the form of an ideal end-state or ultimate fixed
moral standard), and that ethical progress can and does occur. My response here
is to refute the utopian view.
Those who do not share my doubt about the existence of an ideal end-state or
fixed ultimate standard of morality might wonder why they should concern
themselves with considering an alternative account of progress when the utopian
view seems to do just fine in their estimation given their belief in an independent
moral order. In response to this worry I want to stress that my non-utopian
problem-solving account of ethical progress is meant not only to make belief in
progress consistent with denying the existence of an independent moral order, but
also to improve on the utopian account by offering a sort of usefulness that the
utopian account does not provide.
Consider Dewey’s point that we regularly conceive of progress in a variety of
domains even when we do not have a fixed criterion or ideal end toward which
we aim. Thus, even if an ideal end-state or unchanging standard of evaluation did
exist, it is not obvious that we need to appeal to it as a guide in our actual ethical
inquiry. Further, as Moody-Adams points out, it might often be difficult to
determine whether a given change in our beliefs or practices is headed in the
direction of achieving that fixed end-state or meeting that fixed standard; thus
such a conception of moral progress might fail to “have any plausible uses.”8 This
7Michele Moody-Adams, “The idea of moral progress,” Metaphilosophy, 30 (1999), 168–85 at
pp. 168–9. One might object here that we do not need access to the objective moral order in order
for us to make moral progress—it need only be the case that there is an objective moral order and that
our beliefs and practices are, in fact, getting closer to that ideal. This might be so, but I take it that
the underlying concern Moody-Adams is getting at is that many philosophers think there is not an




is because, as Dewey held, ethical inquiry begins when we face a particular
trouble in a given context; our concern in actual ethical deliberation is never to
find a “finally right” way of living, but rather to solve the concrete troubles we
are facing.9
Dewey makes this point in the context of health. Consider a doctor who sees
that a patient is suffering medical troubles and tries to produce a situation in
which these troubles are mitigated. The doctor does not necessarily have in mind
some ideal end-in-itself view of health, yet she or he can still determine whether
the patient is making progress without having a fixed idea of health as the goal
state.10 After all, in many cases patients have little chance of reaching anything
like an ideal state of health and must instead accept trade-offs with regard to
different sorts of health-related troubles and goods. There are likely better and
worse ways to fail to be healthy—better and worse trade-offs to make—but
appeals to an ideal conception of health are unlikely to help in sorting the better
from the worse.
B. NON-UTOPIAN PROGRESS AND THE TENSION11
Having motivated my interest in a non-utopian account of progress, let me now
say a bit about rival non-utopian accounts and why these are not satisfactory. I
suggest that the non-utopian views offered by David Wiggins, Michele
Moody-Adams, and Richard Rorty fail where a Deweyan account
succeeds—with regard to the tension between maintaining rationality and
objectivity in ethics and explaining how radical ethical transitions can be
progressive.12 This tension is a result of the difficulty in constructing a
non-utopian account of ethical progress which neither too severely limits what
can count as progress, nor too permissively allows almost any change to count as
progressive.
In my view, Wiggins’ and Moody-Adams’ views err in the first direction of this
tension. According to their views, ethical improvement arises through the
deepening of concepts (for Moody-Adams) or the drawing of distinctions within
or refinement of concepts (for Wiggins)—not through the introduction of new
concepts. Moody-Adams denies that progress can be achieved through the
introduction of truly new concepts, because, she claims, it is impossible for us to
9John Dewey, “Theory of valuation,” International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. 2
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1939), pp. 15–16.
10Ibid., p. 46.
11This section draws on my “Ethical progress and the goldilocks problem,” Southwest Philosophy
Review (forthcoming). There, I more fully describe the views of Wiggins, Moody-Adams, and Rorty
and the tension I have in mind.
12David Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). Moody-Adams,
“The idea of moral progress.” Richard Rorty, “Dewey and Posner on pragmatism and moral
progress,” University of Chicago Law Review, 74 (2007), 915–27; “Feminism and pragmatism,”
Tanner Lecture on Human Values (lecture, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, December 7
1990).
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assimilate new concepts into our web of values.13 Wiggins also rules out the
possibility of ethical progress taking the form of radical ethical change, for he
rigidifies moral concepts to our moral sensibility here and now.14 This means that
were our sensibility to change in the future, the change would fail a priori to be
an improvement. Neither Moody-Adams nor Wiggins, then, allows radical
ethical change to count as progress.
By “radical” change I have in mind cases in which we replace older values with
new contrasting values not merely in order to maintain coherence in our system
of beliefs and values, but because the new values are seen to be better in some
additional sense—because the new values speak to us, answer our concerns, or
we are better able to live with them. A radical change, then, goes beyond more
minimal moves necessary to preserve coherence in one’s epistemic system and this
is the sort of case which I suggest Moody-Adams and Wiggins cannot account for
as progressive.15
In contrast, Rorty’s view appears to lean too far in the direction of the
second aspect of the tension. Like Kuhn with regard to scientific progress, Rorty
looks to evolution as a proper model for ethical progress. He states,
“[p]rophecy . . . is all that nonviolent political movements can fall back on
when argument fails” and similarly that “once one sees the need for something
more than an appeal to rational acceptability by the standards of the existing
community, then . . . an act of imagination is the only recourse.”16 But this
emphasis on imagination beyond argument or rationality implies that
progressive transitions are not rational or objective, which seems quite
worrisome.17 If our conception of progress is not constrained by some sense of
rationality and objectivity, then how we can distinguish imaginative changes
which, say, undermine women’s subordination from imaginative changes which
further entrench women’s subordination (other than the fact that the former
change is the one we prefer)?
Thus, there exists a tension between attempting to account for radical
evaluative transitions as progressive versus maintaining a sense of ethical
rationality and objectivity for evaluative transitions. Moody-Adams and Wiggins
safeguard rationality and objectivity at the cost of severely limiting what kinds of
13Moody-Adams, “The idea of moral progress,” pp. 170–3.
14Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth, pp. 205–6. Cf. Brad Thompson, “Moral value,
response-dependence, and rigid designation,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 36 (2006), 71–94.
15One way to think about these sorts of radical changes, then, is as revisions to our belief-value
system which do not abide by Quine’s principle of conservativism—the principle that in making a
holistic revision to our web of beliefs we should make only the most minimal change necessary to
maintain coherence. W. W. Quine. From Stimulus to Science. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1995), p. 49.
16Rorty, “Feminism and pragmatism,” pp. 10, 18.
17Rorty himself is unclear on this point. In “Dewey and Posner on pragmatism and moral
progress,” which was originally given as a lecture shortly before his death, he seems more optimistic
about the possibility of such ethical transitions being rational. This strikes me as quite a different tone
on this topic from that found in his earlier “Feminism and pragmatism.”
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changes can count as progressive. Rorty, contrastingly, embraces imagination as
the vehicle of progress while seemingly sacrificing objectivity and rationality. I
aim to steer a course between those taken by Wiggins and Moody-Adams on one
hand and Rorty on the other. After putting forth and defending my
problem-resolution account of progress (in Sections III and IV), I show how my
view can successfully navigate that path (in Sections V and VI).
III. THE PROBLEM-BASED ACCOUNT
The “units” in which I will be thinking about ethical progress are units of
overcome or solved problems. This is a move taken from John Dewey, who is also
interested in understanding progress in a non-utopian way. By “problem” I mean
to pick out a certain sort of experience of ourselves, our beliefs, our values, and
the world. Problems arise when we experience trouble, difficulty, or
conflict—when there is disharmony amongst our empirical beliefs, our values,
and our experience of living.
Why is it the case (or should it be the case) that “problems” play the role they
do in our evaluative inquiry and deliberation? According to Dewey, ethical
inquiry is a habit which we engage in when we experience a lack or a need.18
When we recognize an unfulfilled need or a conflict, we typically search for a way
to overcome the conflict or meet the need. As Dewey puts it, a moral situation (a
problem) is simply one in which judgment and choice are required to produce
action: “[m]oral goods and ends exist only when something has to be done. The
fact that something has to be done proves that there are deficiencies, evils in the
existent situation.”19
In addition, Dewey suggests that viewing moral situations as problems that
call out for solutions provides a kind of empirical test by which we distinguish a
true good from a false good. The test is whether the supposed good solves the
problem which prompted our inquiry in the first place.20 Here Dewey does not
have in mind grand, abstract sorts of potential “goods” such as pleasure or
happiness; rather, he refers to concrete ideals, courses of action, and ways of
living which we must understand in their particularity within the
problem-situations in which they arise as potential solutions.
For all that I have said about Dewey’s pragmatism and problem-solving thus
far, it might seem that problem-solving (and hence ethical progress) is just a
matter of technical or instrumental reasoning such that when we are solving a
problem we are just determining the best means given a fixed end or even multiple
18Dewey, “Theory of valuation,” pp. 15–16.
19John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), pp. 163, 169. A
similar pragmatic picture of ethical inquiry can be found in Hugh LaFollette, “The truth in ethical
relativism,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 22 (1991), 146–54. Thanks to Nathan Nobis for drawing
this article to my attention.
20John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1922), pp. 210–11.
ETHICAL PROGRESS AS PROBLEM-RESOLVING 391
fixed ends.21 Take, for example, Dewey’s roast pork case in which one considers
placing pigs inside one’s house and then burning it down as a means to the end
of having roast pork for dinner.22 The folly of such a pursuit is obvious—surely
having roast pork for dinner is not an end which exists in isolation from other
ends. Any deliberation we undertake about which means to take in pursuit of a
given end must take into consideration to what extent the possible means are
compatible with our other ends. But this point (if this is what Dewey has in mind)
need not generate any objection from a sophisticated instrumentalist—certainly
the shelter and financial asset provided by a house will outweigh any value
provided by a roast pork dinner.
However, Dewey’s roast pork case can also be understood as illuminating
aspects of his view which would indeed give instrumentalists pause. An important
aspect of the roast pork example, which Richardson emphasizes, is that ends and
means ought to be revised in light of each other. The point is not merely that it
is crazy to burn down one’s house in order to eat roast pork given one’s other
more important ends—the point is that if that is what it would take to have roast
pork, then roast pork is not worth wanting (in this situation) in the first place.
Rather than understanding the situation in terms of some ends being more
important than other ends, Dewey’s point is that the means to an end can inform
us about whether that end is worthy.23
Another way to put this point is in terms of our preference-ranking. Dewey’s
point is that we cannot trust a hypothetical ranking of preferences which we
bring to deliberation. Rather, part of what we do in deliberation is change our
preferences given the concrete problem situations that we face. Problems, after
all, do not typically come to us as fully formed and unrevisable. When I suggest
understanding ethical progress in terms of problem-solving I have in mind a
dynamic account of deliberation such that within a given case of deliberation
ends or problems themselves can be revised and reconceived.24
Consider, for example, “the problem of teenage pregnancy.” Presumably, most
Americans would agree that “teen pregnancy” is a problem. But agreement fades
once we try to conceive of this problem with any degree of concreteness or to
place the problem in a context which would guide us in thinking about what sorts
of solutions are apt.
21Henry Richardson suggests that some of Dewey’s rhetoric supports this interpretation of Dewey.
See Henry Richardson, “Truth and ends in Dewey,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 24 (1998),
109–47.
22Dewey borrows the following story of the supposed origin of roast pork from Charles Lamb:
One day a pig wandered inside a house and the house subsequently burned down. While the owners
were searching for belongings in the charred remains, they burned their fingers touching the well-done
pigs. When they brought their fingers to their mouths to soothe them they had their first taste of roast
pork. (Dewey, “Theory of valuation,” pp. 40–1.)
23Richardson, “Truth and ends in Dewey,” pp. 116–18.
24I develop this dynamic conception of deliberation further in my “Dynamic deliberation of ends:
a case study” (unpublished manuscript, January 2011).
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A common progressive approach conceives of teen pregnancy—along with
STD transmission—as a public health issue. Teen pregnancy requires adolescents
who do not have the benefit of emotional or intellectual maturity to make very
adult decisions about abortion, adoption, health, and parenting; and even the
best-made decisions of these sorts will often involve substantial costs in terms of
a teen’s emotional health as well as their educational opportunities and future
financial well-being. But, of course, we have the technology to prevent
pregnancy—we need only provide easy access to effective birth control and
convince teens to take control of their reproductive health and diligently use it.
In contrast, a typical traditionalist approach offers a quite different take on the
problem. While certainly the emotional, educational, and financial costs of teen
pregnancy matter, other values at stake in teen pregnancy are seen as equally or
more important. Teen pregnancy, after all, is just one symptom of a much deeper
problem having to do with the breakdown of the traditional family and the
upending of conservative (often religious) views about sexual purity outside of
marriage. On this understanding, the liberal attraction to the public health
approach is itself just another symptom of the modern misvaluing of sexuality
and the only promising type of solution is, then, one that involves a
transformation of cultural sexual values.
Still other ways of formulating the problem might find both the progressive
and traditionalist approaches lacking. For instance, we might focus our attention
on the demographics of teen pregnancy, single motherhood, and marriage and
divorce rates. We might thus realize that the suggestion to engage in sex only
within marriage is a particularly problematic suggestion amongst demographic
groups for whom marriage rates have plummeted in recent decades. Similarly we
might notice that pregnancy at a young age among some low-income teenagers is
a deliberate choice given an accurate assessment of their socio-economic chances
in a markedly racially and socio-economically stratified society.25 Thus we might
think that only a multi-faceted approach to the problem of teen pregnancy can
succeed given that the motivations and expectations of teens when it comes to
sex, marriage, and parenthood differ significantly with race and socio-economic
status.
Thus, in contrast to the common view that Americans disagree as to how to
solve problems such as teen pregnancy, I suggest that we do not even agree about
what the problem is.26 It is only when we recognize the role of problems in ethical
25Arline Geronimus and Sanders Korenman, “The socioeconomic consequences of teen
childbearing reconsidered,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107 (1992), 1187–214.
26This difficulty goes beyond mere contrasting views about how to interpret a problem which we
all agree exists—for “teen pregnancy” is much too vague to be a description of a problem. And once
an attempt to specify a problem is made, the apparent agreement about “teen pregnancy” fades. To
see this, consider a case of 17-year-olds who decide to marry and become parents immediately after
high school. In such a case the traditionalist values of upholding the importance of heterosexual
marriage and abstinence until marriage are not at stake, though the progressive values having to do
with emotional maturity and educational and future financial opportunities are still in play regardless
of whether teen sex and parenthood takes place within or outside of marriage. Thus progressives
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inquiry that we can fully appreciate contemporary political disagreements about
issues such as teen pregnancy and explain why otherwise reasonable individuals
can seem to act in completely unreasonable ways when confronting such issues.
IV. SOME FIRST-PASS WORRIES
Having just laid out and motivated the problem-solving account, I would like
now to consider two intuitive objections to this model: the modest proposal
worry and the scope of problems worry. My intent here is to show that these
objections do not cause serious difficulties for the problem-solving account and,
in so doing, to further develop my view. I begin with what I call the modest
proposal objection, which is substantially related to the previous discussion of
Dewey’s roast pork story and teen pregnancy.
A. THE MODEST PROPOSAL OBJECTION
Given what I have said in the previous section—that problem-resolving is a
matter of overcoming problems and that part of what we do in ethical
deliberation is reconceive problems—one might worry that on my view any
change which makes it the case that a trouble is no longer pressing counts as a
resolution to that problem. But couldn’t we sometimes make a trouble no longer
pressing in morally abhorrent ways? Consider a sort of “modest proposal” in
response to the problem of teen pregnancy: legally require all children as they
reach puberty to undergo sterilization.27 Couldn’t such a proposed solution be a
true solution to the problem of teen pregnancy—at least on the progressive
conception of the problem—and hence be an instance of ethical progress as I have
characterized it? But isn’t it absurd to suggest that sterilizing all teenagers would
be ethically progressive?
Indeed, the idea that forcibly sterilizing all children at puberty could be
ethically progressive is completely implausible. Fortunately my view does not
have any such consequence. Rather, this objection stems from a
misunderstanding about the nature of problems and problem-solutions as they
figure into my view. I want to respond to this misconception by emphasizing two
aspects of the problem-solving view—first, that a way of overcoming a problem
counts as a real solution (and hence as progressive) only if it does not create more
serious or intractable problems, and second, that what can count as a
problem-solution depends importantly upon background values.
likely think there is a problem in this case—one they might still call “teen pregnancy”—which
traditionalists might not recognize as a problem. Cf. Naomi Cahn and June Carbone, Red Families
v. Blue Families: Legal Polarization and the Creation of Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010). Thanks to reviewer Lea Ypi for pressing me to clarify this point about interpretive differences
versus problem-setting.
27I allude here, of course, to the satirical modest proposal offered by Jonathan Swift, A Modest
Proposal and Other Satirical Works, ed. Candace Ward (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1996).
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Take first the point that overcoming a trouble is a problem-solution only
if it does not produce new, more difficult problems. We can see this in the
teen pregnancy case if we consider the consequences of sterilizing all
teenagers—would this not create a new problem having to do with how to
replace the country’s population as Americans naturally age and die without the
ability to reproduce in the usual way? And at stake here are not only the costs to
Americans as citizens of a country which will have to creatively replace its
population, but also to Americans as individuals, many of whose meaningful
life-plans of becoming parents will be thwarted. These are problems that are
unrelated to the original teen pregnancy problem, but are more intractable
difficulties of significantly greater magnitude. Surely causing oneself massively
larger problems cannot be the best way to solve a problem.
But what if we revise the original suggested problem-solution? What if, instead
of permanent sterilization, adolescents are required to receive semi-permanent
birth control which can be removed for medical reasons or upon reaching the age
of majority? This solution would avoid the significant problems mentioned
above, but remain almost as effective as permanent sterilization. What can be
said, on my view, against this (still intuitively unconvincing and perhaps
revolting) response to teen pregnancy counting as progressive?
Here I want to invoke the second point mentioned above regarding
understandable misconceptions about the problem-solving view. How we
conceive of a problem and what can count as a solution to a problem given a
particular conception depends upon background values. As I suggested earlier, a
diverse set of values leads Americans to find teen pregnancy to be troubling, but
common to most everyone who finds it worrisome are concerns about the
wellbeing of the teenagers themselves—whether this is understood in terms of
physical or emotional well-being and health, having decent life-chances, or being
morally pure.
But will these very concerns not lead us to reject the idea of legally forcing the
placement of semi-permanent birth control on adolescents? We should expect
that for many physically or psychologically immature pubescent children, the
exams and procedures necessary for receiving birth control will be embarrassing
or painful. Since puberty is occurring at younger ages, many children will not be
emotionally capable of understanding themselves as potentially sexual or
procreative agents at the time they will begin receiving birth control.28 In other
words, giving all pubescent children birth control does not appear to be
something that coheres with the sort of values that lead most Americans to find
teen pregnancy worrisome in the first place. Put another way, so long as we take
28Traditionalists will also worry that providing even older teens with birth control will encourage
sexual activity. Progressives will object to the state’s violating the sexual and reproductive autonomy
of children and teens. And those who look at the issue through the lens of racial and socio-economic
justice will point out that in general preventing the worst-off teens from getting pregnant will not
actually improve their life chances.
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teen pregnancy to be a problem (at least in part) because of concern for the
interests and well-being of children and teenagers themselves, problem-solutions
will have to stand up to these values. Potential solutions which violate these
values will simply fail to pass Dewey’s test for distinguishing a true solution from
a false one.
Is this to say, though, that whatever background values we begin with are
fixed? Am I suggesting that it is impossible to realize that we were mistaken about
some values? No—the considerations of the interests, rights, and dignity of teens
need not be understood as fixed or absolute considerations. Rather, they are to be
understood as those values which we actually have that prompted us to see teen
pregnancy as a problem. We do not start our ethical inquiry from scratch,
questioning which if any values are worth caring about; rather we always must
begin from where we are.
What I am suggesting, then, is a kind of holism about our ethical inquiry; all
of the various aspects of our system are revisable. Our goals, our values, our
epistemic norms, our theoretical beliefs—all must face the test of experience.29 If
we think that we have a grasp upon a problem, but we find that the means needed
to solve it are morally abhorrent or have failed to perform as expected in practice,
then we likely have incorrectly identified our problem and further specification or
revision may be needed.30
In the course of specifying and revising our problems, however, there always
remains the brute fact of value—that, as Dewey puts it, “judgment at some point
runs against the brute act of holding something dear as its limit.”31 All values are
revisable—all must face the test of experience. But it is not the case that all values
can be revised or up for grabs at once. In any given attempt to conceive of a
problem or search for a solution, some values will go unquestioned.32 In any
particular case of deliberation, then, values which we hold in this brute way will
tell against many potential problem-resolutions.
One might wonder, what determines whether in a given case of
problem-solving we should reaffirm values, revise them, or reject them? To shed
some light here I want to introduce some technical terminology. I propose that we
let the technical term “problem-resolutions” be the units of ethical progress and
29One question here is whether it can really be the case that all aspects of the system are revisable.
Consider the epistemic norm of coherence—could we revise this norm or is it rather constitutive of
rationality? In my view coherence is both constitutive of rationality and a revisable epistemic norm.
Given what we understand rationality to be, pervasive incoherence in one’s system of beliefs and
values is obviously irrational. And yet, in saying this, we need not thereby also claim that this
understanding of rationality and the resulting commitment to coherence is unrevisable. It is not true
a priori that coherence is constitutive of rationality.
30It is worth noting the heavy burden that coherence is bearing here. Cf. Richard De George,
“Ethics and coherence,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 64
(#3) (1990), 39–52.
31John Dewey, “The logic of judgments of practice.” The Middle Works 1899–1924, ed. J. A.
Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1979), vol. 8, pp. 14–82 at p. 46.
32In the teen pregnancy case one of the values that seems to go unquestioned—or perhaps is
reevaluated and reaffirmed—is the concern for teens’ emotional and psychological well-being.
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that we distinguish this term from looser speaking about solutions or overcoming
problems. The term “resolution,” I think, strikes the right cord. Consider a
typical discussion of a situation in which we say that a particular individual has
“unresolved” family issues.” With this phrase we seem to imply that the person
feels that s/he has suffered an unacknowledged wrong or has not been given
his/her due. With regard to problem-resolving, then, for a way of dealing with a
problem to be worthy of the term “resolution,” each relevant value must be given
its due. This contrasts with merely “overcoming a trouble” which does not
similarly imply giving each value its due; after all, we sometimes overcome a
trouble by “getting over it” or by repressing feelings of resentment and anger, but
this is not really the same as resolving it.
The trick, of course, is determining what that due is for any suggested value.
It is not always easy to determine which potential values matter in a given
situation or how much they matter. But at a minimum one thing that “giving
due” requires is actually responding to the concerns that spring from values
which we already hold. For the sake of coherence and consistency, we must either
live up to those values, appropriately revise the values, or reject the values if we
find them not worth holding after all. Thus we will want to avoid what Charles
Taylor refers to as “special pleadings” or “rationalizations” in the form of ad hoc
exceptions; and we might think, as Taylor suggests regarding Nazism, that these
sorts of pressures toward coherence and consistency can go a long way in
showing the irrationality of many morally abhorrent events in recent history.33
So, resolving a problem, on my view, requires overcoming troubles in a way that
does justice to all of the relevant values to which we remain committed and, if we
revise or reject values, being capable of offering a non-ad-hoc justification for
that revision or rejection.
B. THE SCOPE OF PROBLEMS OBJECTION
Having responded to the “modest proposal” worry, I now want to attend to the
“scope of problems” concern. How do we distinguish one problem from
another? When seemingly unrelated difficulties we encounter are caused by an
underlying situation, do we have two problems or only one? If we manage to
overcome a trouble only to then be affected by another similar trouble, have we
really solved the problem, or are we just masking symptoms?
Here I think we should look again to Dewey’s example of health problems.
The importance of going beyond treatment of symptoms and discovering the
relevant underlying trouble is obvious in medical cases. If physicians concern
themselves only with overcoming symptoms, they risk allowing serious
33Charles Taylor, “Explanation and practical reason,” The Quality of Life, ed. M. Nussbaum and
A. Sen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 208–231 at p. 209.
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underlying health problems to fester. But of course, what is a symptom and what
is an underlying trouble is not always clear. Take a patient suffering fatigue,
dizziness, and a blood count consistent with iron deficient anemia. For some
patients, the iron deficiency itself is the underlying problem and iron
supplementation is the solution.34 But for others the iron deficiency can be both
a cause of symptoms like fatigue and dizziness as well as a symptom of a more
serious issue such as an intestinal bleeding disorder. We expect medical
professionals to consider and rule out underlying conditions as ultimate causes;
intuitively we recognize that a physician who attends to fatigue and dizziness but
who fails to discover and treat intestinal bleeding has not resolved the patient’s
problem.
Similarly, in the case of ethical, social, and political problems, accurate
identification of the scope of a problem is likely to be one of the main challenges
to resolving problems. Take, for example, the work-related troubles faced by
many women in the US in the 1960–70s. A major difficulty (for middle-class,
white, heterosexual women, in particular) was lack of access to education at
many elite institutions and to prestigious and well-paying positions in
non-traditionally feminine career-paths.35 One way to conceive of the problem
these women were facing—a conception which I believe did gain significant
traction at that time—is in terms of constricting gender norms (especially those
which relegated women to the role of homemaker and mother), overt
discrimination denying women educational and employment opportunities, and
hostile treatment toward women in the workplace.
An appropriate sort of resolution to this problem-so-conceived is just what the
women’s movement of the time managed to accomplish: the broadening of
socially appropriate roles for women, legal protection against many forms of
sex/gender discrimination, and the social and legal recognition of sexual
harassment. And these changes do, in fact, appear to have radically transformed
the situation of many American women in regard to work.
Yet it also seems clear that even today, middle-class, white, heterosexual
women—those most likely to be helped by the changes of the 1960s and
70s—continue to face significant work-related troubles. The nature of these
troubles, though, has significantly changed. American women no longer have
trouble obtaining elite educations in comparison to American men (and, in fact,
34Some mostly innocuous potential causes of iron deficiency are hereditary disposition,
vegetarianism, and heavy menstrual periods.
35It is important to note that for many low-income women and women of color, lack of access to
higher education and prestigious careers was as much a function of their socio-economic class and
race as it was a function of their sex/gender. Similarly, gender norms assigning women to homemaking
were likely much less binding on black and poor women who would have needed to work (likely in
low-paying pink collar jobs) even as their middle-class white counterparts might have felt compelled
not to pursue a career. Cf. Stephanie Coontz, The Way We Never Were: American Families and the
Nostalgia Trap (New York: Basic Books, 1992), esp. ch. 2.
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are increasingly outnumbering men at many elite liberal arts colleges and
universities), are protected from sex-based employment discrimination, and have
legal recourse if subjected to sexual harassment. But a significant problem for
many women pursuing professional careers today has to do with how to
successfully combine the pursuit of such a career with being a mother. At issue is
how to equitably share domestic and parenting duties with one’s
partner—particularly given that professional women still tend to shoulder a
greater proportion of these duties than professional men—and how to prevent
those responsibilities from negatively impacting one’s career—particularly given
the long hours that many professional positions require.36
How should we understand the relation between these two kinds of trouble?
We could think of the work difficulties of the 1960s-70s and the difficulties of
today as two distinct problems—one which was successfully solved in the 1970s
and one which is still ongoing. Reflecting on the anemia example, however, I
suggest instead that we think of these troubles as symptoms of the same
condition—that is, different manifestations of the same root problem. On this
understanding we can say that it was faulty to conceive of the (middle-class,
white, heterosexual) women’s work problem as having to do with constricting
gender norms, discrimination, and hostile work environments. Feminists and
law-makers were right to think that the resolution of that problem-so-conceived
was legal change and revising of gender norms. But we are now in the position
to see a better way of conceiving of both the current trouble and the earlier
trouble as importantly related.
The root problem of the troubles of the 1960s-70s, we might conclude, was
not just that women were not treated equally when it came to opportunities for
education and career. Rather, the problem was (and is) that treating men and
women equally in the sphere of work will continue to disadvantage women so
long as women and men do not equally share duties in the domestic sphere and
so long as the work sphere is organized on the basis of a presumption of a
gendered division of labor at home. In other words, the structure of much
professional work in the US seems to have developed with a certain sort of person
in mind—a main breadwinner whose body is not subject to pregnancy,
childbearing, or breastfeeding and whose domestic needs (including producing
and rearing children as well as reproducing his labor potential) are met by
someone else (a wife). Though women have now entered professional careers in
massive numbers this basic structure of work—and in important ways, the basic
36Joan C. Williams, “How the tenure track discriminates against women,” The Chronicle of
Higher Education, October 27, 2000. Joan C. Williams, Jessica Manvell and Stephanie Bornstein,
‘Opt out’ or pushed out?: how the press covers work/family conflict (Center for WorkLife Law—UC
Hastings College of the Law, 2006), <http://www.uchastings.edu/site_files/WLL/OptOutPushed
Out.pdf>. Mary Ann Mason and Marc Goulden, “Do babies matter? The effect of family formation
on the lifelong careers of academic men and women,” Academe (Nov-Dec 2002); “Do babies matter
(part ii)? Closing the baby gap,” Academe (Nov-Dec 2004).
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structure of home—has not changed as significantly.37 The underlying “disorder”
causing women’s work troubles during the second-wave, then, goes far deeper
than the second-wave attempts at solutions acknowledged and we have still not
managed to resolve that problem-properly-conceived.
There is an important worry here, however, about this take on the scope of the
problem of women and work. If we say that the troubles of a few generations ago
and those today are symptoms of the same problem, then it looks as if we have
not managed a resolution. And since I have argued for understanding ethical
progress in terms of problem-resolutions, it follows that we have not made any
progress on this issue. But how can this be? Is it not obvious that revising
constricting gender norms, ending de jure sex discrimination, and protecting
women from sexual harassment was progress?
One way to account for this intuition is in terms of diagnostic progress. We
have the insight we do about how to properly conceive of women’s work and
family troubles only as result of our prior attempt at conceiving and solving this
problem; it was only as a result of making previous insufficient changes that we
now can better grasp our problem and what a solution would require—thus,
those changes are a necessary step along the route to progress.38 But doesn’t our
sense of how the changes discussed above were progressive go beyond mere
diagnosis? Indeed, by insisting that in our attempts to resolve problems, we must
look to the underlying cause of troubles, I do not want to suggest that responding
to symptoms cannot be progressive in its own right. Again, there is a parallel with
the anemia case. A doctor might manage to successfully treat a patient’s fatigue
and dizziness even as s/he has not yet managed to treat the underlying intestinal
disorder causing the patient’s iron deficiency. In such a case, wouldn’t we say that
the patient really is better off without suffering from fatigue and dizziness even if
the underlying health problem continues?
This is just to say that what counts as a medical problem and how best to
conceive of a particular medical trouble is tricky business. But the slipperiness of
problems—and the manner in which, at different stages in the diagnostic and
treatment process, a health difficulty might either be viewed as a problem in itself
or as a mere symptom—in no way undermines our belief that there can really be
better and worse ways to conceive of medical problems and more and less
successful ways to overcome them given our health-related values. In these cases,
the end of overcoming a symptom functions very much like a Deweyan
end-in-view. At any given time, we are aiming toward that end both for its own
37Consider that it is still quite rare for men to be homemakers or stay-at-home-parents, but not
uncommon for women to do so. This means that a good number of (heterosexual) male professionals
experience the career benefit of their female partner’s taking on the homemaking/primary care-taker
role (even if only for a short period) while significantly fewer (heterosexual) professional women
experience this benefit.
38This is not all that different to the way a physician might go about treating anemia and
anemia-related symptoms—trying out a simple treatment (iron supplements) and investigating further
only if that treatment is unsuccessful.
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sake and for the sake of other ends (as in when we aim to overcome the patient’s
fatigue for its own sake as well as for the sake of making a more precise
diagnosis). Just as it is with the domain of health, so I suggest it is with the
domain of ethics.
V. ETHICAL VALUES AND RADICAL REVISIONS
In the last two sections I laid out the problem-resolving account and considered
a number of potential objections to that view. I would like now to return to some
claims I made at the outset of this article. First, I suggested that the views offered
by Wiggins, Moody-Adams, and Rorty are unable to successfully navigate the
tension between maintaining rationality and objectivity and accounting for
radical revision of values. Second, I claimed that my view can do better. I would
like now to say something about how my account can make good on the latter
claim. That is, I want to put forth a case of radical transition in values which still
maintains a sense of rationality and objectivity. So in the rest of this section I will
lay out some details of an example of a radical transition and then go on to
characterize that transition as the result of a kind of learning process.
Consider the story of Tim Zaal as an example of this sort of ethical
transition.39 Zaal is a former racist skinhead who currently works with the
Museum of Tolerance in Los Angeles providing educational programs promoting
tolerance. Zaal became part of the skinhead movement as a young adult and
eventually entered into a relationship with a woman he met through the
movement. When the couple became parents, they introduced their son to
neo-Nazism early on such that his first words were “nigger” and “kike.”
Meanwhile, Zaal and his partner were preparing for the Aryan war—hiding
thousands of rounds of ammunition under the child’s crib, initiating young teens
into their Nazi organization, and assaulting gays in the streets.
What was the turning point for Zaal? There does not seem to have been any
one event that provided the critical moment, but there were a number of
interrelated events that led Zaal to begin to see himself and neo-Nazism in a new
light. One such event occurred when his partner came to suspect that their child
might have American Indian ancestry; she insisted that if this were true, she
would kill the child herself. This came as a shock to Zaal, as he realized he did
not share his partner’s willingness to kill the child if he turned out to be of less
than “pure” blood. After other incidents involving threats to his son’s safety,
Zaal began to question his lifestyle. He also came to doubt the justice of the
Aryan code, which asked Zaal to take great risks while leaders remained safe
from the eye of the law. Within a few years of breaking off the relationship with
39Yolanda Sansegundo-Montero, “From vengeance to tolerance,” Tusk: The Student
Magazine of Cal State Fullerton, 6 (2006), <http://tuskmagazine.fullerton.edu/tusk2005/vengence/
vengence1.html>.
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his partner and leaving the movement, Zaal had begun dating a Jewish woman
and volunteering for the Museum of Tolerance.40
How can we, on a non-utopian view of ethical progress, make sense of a story
like Zaal’s as an instance of a warranted ethical revision? One path to take is to
rationally reconstruct Zaal’s revision of his values on the basis of some type of
epistemic value such as explanatory success or coherence. Surely Zaal’s views
were flawed on grounds of coherence; for instance, he likely believed anti-Semitic
and racist stereotypes despite also having available the empirical evidence to
show the falsity of those views. Yet this type of empirical deficiency does not fully
explain Zaal’s radical transition and problem-resolution; the transition which
actually occurred was very different from the minimal transition that was
required to overcome such an empirical conflict. Zaal could have retained his
commitment to the goals of neo-Nazism, yet decided that it was not worth
endangering his son or going to jail for him to be an active part of trying to
achieve those goals. But Zaal did not make these more minimal changes to his
values. Instead, he undertook a 180° change with regard to his worldview.
Why did Zaal choose such a radical way of solving the problem of conflict
within his system of empirical beliefs and values? I think the answer is that the
last sentence offers too shallow a conception of what Zaal’s problem was. His
problem, I suggest, was not just a matter of how to maintain epistemic coherence
in his belief and value system—his problem was how to have a belief and value
system that he could live with.
Here I am emphasizing the idea of being able to “live with” our values and this
gestures toward a kind of coherence that goes beyond the usual conception of
epistemic coherence which I have been appealing to up until this point in this
article—that is, coherence understood in terms of a fit between empirical beliefs
and (affirmed) values. I have in mind a kind of emotional incoherence which we
can see when we consider Zaal’s point of view as he and his partner suspected
that their child might be part of an “undesirable” race. We might say that Zaal
here found a conflict between the value of being a good father and being a good
neo-Nazi (or member of the Aryan community) as he understood those values.41
Of course, this sort of a conflict could be solved by revising the values in
question—for example, by understanding a good father within the context of
neo-Nazism. But these revisions, I propose, were not the sort of revisions that
Zaal could live with. Though they may have strictly speaking restored epistemic
coherence between his beliefs and values, they could not restore a kind of
practical or emotional coherence.
In my view Zaal came upon a kind of evidence about what is good—what is
worth pursuing, what ways of life are valuable—in finding himself emotionally
40Ibid.
41Another way to put this is that Zaal came to see that the way of life he thought he had—as a
good father and a good neo-Nazi—was not possible. And seeing the impossibility of the way of life
he thought he was living sent Zaal searching for another way to live.
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and psychologically unable to live in certain ways.42 The point here is similar to
a point we might draw from work on moral psychology and the committing of
atrocities, which describes how various psychological mechanisms and social
arrangements were necessary for many actual perpetuators of atrocity to be able
to take part. Specifically, these mechanisms and arrangements allowed
individuals to take part in these atrocities while avoiding being honest with
themselves about what they were doing and what they really valued.43 The
inability to be honest with oneself about what one is doing, or the inability to live
with the values to which one thinks one is committed, can be understood as a sort
of evidence. Certainly this type of evidence does not fit into our usual way of
thinking about evidence and confirmation of theories, in part because it is
irreducibly first-personal. On this view, a reasoner who has actually been a
neo-Nazi can know not only the same third-personal sociological and
psychological facts that the rest of us can know, but can also know what it is like
“for me” to take part in neo-Nazism.
This first-personal sort of evidence is particularly important when we face
questions having to do with our good, in contrast to questions of the right—for
example, what we owe to each other. In the case of the good, it is of utmost
importance what it is like for me—for each of us—to live in different ways; after
all, it might be that the sort of life that is a good life for me is not good for
others.44
I am suggesting that we can reconstruct the learning process by which Zaal
came to solve his problem by rejecting neo-Nazism. And we understand his own
experience of living as a neo-Nazi as a kind of first personal evidence, which
eventually demonstrated that such a life was not for him because that life was not
a practically or emotionally coherent one; Zaal simply could not live with the
beliefs and values such a life demanded. If this is so, then there need be no
difficulty in allowing such a radical transition—from neo-Nazi to tolerance
42We might say that Zaal took part in a sort of “experiment in living.” Cf. Elizabeth Anderson,
“Reply to critics of my ‘Uses of value judgments in feminist social science,’ ” Symposia on Gender,
Race, and Philosophy, 2 (#1) (2006) <http://web.mit.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/sgrp/2006/no1/
Anderson0106.pdf>; “John Stuart Mill and experiments in living,” Ethics, 102 (1991), 4–26.
43Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1999). Glover describes how, in the case of the Nazis, these mechanisms included
increasing bureaucratization and division of labor in running the death camps, “cold jokes,” and
purposeful humiliation. Primo Levi recalls an instance when Jews who were released after days of
being stuffed into rail-cars relieved themselves in plain sight. Nazi guards and bystanders “openly
expressed their disgust: people like this deserve their fate, just look at how they behave. These are not
Menschen, human beings, but animals” (Glover, p. 342). Glover also quotes Franz Stangl, the
commandant of Treblinka, who explains the point of such humiliation as aiming “[t]o condition those
who actually had to carry out the policies. To make it possible for them to do what they did” (Glover,
p. 343). Laurance Thomas puts this same point in terms of respect—by forcing the Jews to live in
subhuman conditions it became “very nearly impossible for Nazi soldiers to experience the Jews as
worthy of respect.” (Lawrence Thomas, “Morality, consistency, and the self: a lesson from
rectification,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 32 (2001), 374–81 at p. 376.)
44There is room for views about the good life to differ amongst different individuals, but there
seems to be a much greater pressure toward convergence in the case of the right.
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educator—to count as progressive while maintaining a sense of rationality and
objectivity, for Zaal’s transition solved a significant problem he was facing.45 In
the face of conflict, Zaal had to reevaluate his beliefs and values and we can
imagine that in doing so he found that above all he was committed to being a
good father and to loving and valuing his son. Rejecting his previous neo-Nazi
beliefs and values, then, resolved Zaal’s problem by giving proper due to the
commitments Zaal found worthy and by restoring both emotional and epistemic
coherence to Zaal’s system of beliefs and values.
I have been arguing that we can see Zaal’s transition in terms of his
determining what sort of life was best for him. But I think we can also use this
problem-resolving lens to see how we resolve problems about how to live with
one another. Recall the example I mentioned at the outset of the article—the end
of Jim Crow and the election of an African-American president. It is clear that
during the civil rights movement Americans found they were unable to live with
one another in the old ways—just consider the black protests, the violent reaction
of southern law enforcement, and the need for the intervention of the National
Guard in southern cities.46 And note that many white individuals, particularly
northern whites and white southern moderates, found that they were unable to
live with the values they had previously—perhaps passively—espoused as they
saw the fruition of those values playing out in the form of fire hoses and dogs
being used against peaceful black protesters.47 A radical change to the old way of
life—a change that we might see as having led to the very possibility we have now
actualized, that of a popularly elected black president—was required to restore
peace and order. So, while I have been emphasizing the first personal aspect of
problem-resolution, there is also, I think, much to be said about the second
personal aspects of problem-resolution—about how we resolve problems
together.48
45To reiterate my claim from Section II, this way of conceiving of ethical progress in terms of
radical value transitions steers a path between Moody-Adams’ and Wiggins’ views on one
hand—which, I argued, are committed to limits on how radical a value transition may be while still
potentially counting as progress—and Rorty’s view on the other—which will seemingly allow for any
degree of radicalness, but only at the cost of undermining the sense of rationality and objectivity of
the transition.
46Jason Sokol, There Goes My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil Rights, 1945–
1975 (New York: Vintage, 2006). Sokol highlights the extent to which the demonstrations of the civil
rights movement interrupted the dominant narrative about race relations. According to the dominant
narrative, segregation was good for everyone because blacks required white paternalism and blacks
were happy with their position in society (p. 14). But Sokol describes how when King and the SCLC
came to Albany, Georgia, “Whites felt themselves besieged by ‘outside agitators,’ and . . . could barely
believe their eyes when the ‘good Negroes’ of Albany—‘their Negroes’—demonstrated that they were
anything but content. In the face of black protest, the white myth of ‘good race relations’ blew away
with the wind” (p. 12). The need for a new narrative to account for the unfolding events was pressing.
Thus, one need not have begun with racially-egalitarian sympathies in order to have encountered a
problem during the civil rights movement.
47Ibid., p. 31.
48Of course, to talk of situations in which we solve “our” problem of how to live together is to
venture into the arena of the right. As I stated earlier, fully developing the problem-resolution account
with regard to the right goes beyond the scope of this article.
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VI. CONCLUSION: A LINGERING WORRY
In conclusion, I want to flag an important worry with regard to Zaal’s transition
and gesture toward a response. I have argued that we can understand Zaal’s way
of resolving his problem as the outcome of a sort of learning process—and hence
as maintaining a sense of rationality. However, to show that Zaal’s way of
resolving his problem was rational is not yet to rule out alternative ways of
resolving that problem which are equally rational. Why, one might wonder,
couldn’t a transition go in the other direction and still make a claim to being
progressive? For instance, when Zaal finds himself having emotional trouble
dealing with the idea of killing his son despite his commitment to the abstract
goal of exterminating “impure” groups of people, couldn’t he resolve this conflict
in favor of the abstract goal rather than in favor of his repulsion at the thought
of killing his son? For instance, if Zaal could successfully repress the emotions in
question, couldn’t he then “live with” his neo-Nazi lifestyle? And wouldn’t that,
then, be a resolution to his problem and so a case of ethical progress?
Here I think it must be stated up front that I cannot deny that this is possible.
Whether one can resolve a problem of emotional incoherence by repressing the
emotions in question depends on both empirical facts and values. This proposed
problem-resolution will fail, of course, if an individual cannot undertake it
without violating background values to which they continue to affirm or if the
course of action leads to even worse and more intransigent troubles than the
original problem. I think there is significant reason to think that in actual cases
of Nazis or neo-Nazis the proposed problem-resolution would fail for one or
both of these reasons.
Consider, for instance, the sorts of values which would speak against
suppressing normal human emotions—the desire to experience typical familial
bonds, romantic love, or affectionate friendships and perhaps the desire to
maintain an Ayran community in which loyalty and compassion (for other
Aryans at least) is important. An individual who is considering this course of
action will have to ask themselves: if this is what I or we have to do in order to
make the world pure, is it worth it?
We cannot rule out a priori, of course, that someone could answer that
question in the affirmative and could go on to bear the costs. However, one who
does so still remains rationally criticizable for any glaring incoherencies, special
pleadings, or refusals to acknowledge evidence within their system of beliefs and
values. Thus, if Taylor is correct in his view that Nazi beliefs and values can only
be supported by special pleadings, such ways of living will still fail to be rational.
Hence such ways of living cannot make a claim to be equally as good as the
contrasting tolerant way of life (so long as the tolerant way of life avoids or
overcomes the special-pleadings and incoherencies that the intolerant way of
living commits). There are, after all, many dimensions of criticism available here,
including dimensions of rational or epistemic criticism.
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This way of responding to the worry, however, still leaves open the question of
whether a Nazi or neo-Nazi lifestyle might be ethically criticizable in a way
distinct from criticizing the norms of reasoning involved in such a lifestyle. If a
person finds that they can live with the Nazi/neo-Nazi lifestyle and that they can
live with the overt irrationality in their reasoning which the lifestyle requires,
would this not still be a good life for him or her? I think that it might, in fact, turn
out in some cases that a good life—or at least one kind of a good life—for a
particular individual is a morally horrendous life.49 If there are individuals who
cannot find tolerant, compassionate ways of life livable or who find themselves
truly able to live in violent, cruel, hardened ways, then indeed it does seem hard
to see how that the latter way of life would fail to be good for such persons.50
Given Dewey’s pragmatist underpinnings which I appealed to in developing
my view, however, there need not be anything worrying about admitting as much.
After all, as Dewey insists, we learn about the good from trying out ways of life
and seeing if they are satisfying. What else could a pragmatic kind of evidence for
goodness be? On the sort of pragmatist-inspired view I am offering, the ultimate
ethical authority can be no one and nothing but our own experiences of trying to
live.
49I should note again that I am primarily concerned in this article with the good. Even if it turns
out that for a particular individual a good life is one of Nazism, surely it does not follow that the
practices involved in Nazism are morally permissible or can be justly permitted by the state.
50Of course, it is a matter of empirical fact how often this is the case; I suspect that it is rare.
Assuming, however, that some individuals do truly find themselves able to live in these ways, it is hard
to see what evidence or experiences could show such a person that she is mistaken. This, of course,
does not preclude the rest of us from continuing to strongly disapprove of her values.
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